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INTRODUCTION
The regulation of insider trading in the United States has been a failure, I both in
analytical 2 and practical terms. 3 Even though the Securities and Exchange Commission
and the federal courts devote substantial resources to the eradication of insider trading,4
insider trading continues to flourish. 5 Notwithstanding the numerous efforts of schol-
ars, 6 judges, 7 the SEC8 and, occasionally, Congress 9 to rationalize and articulate
principled and workable restrictions on insider trading, no coherent regulatory scheme
has yet emerged. '0 Indeed, even now, twenty-five years after insider trading in market
transactions was first regulated under Rule lOb-5, there is not even agreement on the
fundamental question of whether insider trading ought to be regulated."
* Dean of the College of Law, University of Wyoming
1. See Carlton and Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REv. 857, 859, 866 (1983); Dooley,
Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REv. 1, 2, 7 (1980); Scott, Insider Trading: Rule l0b-5,
Disclosure and Corporate Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL S7Uw. 801, 818 (1980). See also Is the SEC Big Enough for the Job?, Wash.
Post, May 25, 1986, at Fl;Wall Street's Army of Insiders, N.Y. Times, May 18, 1986, § 3, at 1 and the many articles
that appear each year in the Wall Street Journal and other financial publications announcing the commencement,
pendency, or termination of investigations or litigation concerning insider trading. Indeed, according to Professor Dooley,
insider trading violations are the most common type of federal securities law violations. Dooley, supra, at 7.
2. See, e.g., Easterbrook, Insider Trading. Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges and the Production of
Information, 1981 Sup. CT. REv. 309; Fischel, Insider Trading and Investment Analysts: An Economic Analysis of Dirks
v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 13 HosmrA. L. REv. 127 (1984).
3. See Dooley, supra note 1, at 1; Scott, supra note 1, at 818; Is the SEC Big Enough for the Job?, supra note
1. But representatives of the SEC believe that insider trading enforcement is working well. See Goelzer, Symposium on
Insider Trading-Introduction, 13 Homs'ns L. REv. 1, 7 n.16 (1984); remarks of Chairman Shad, reprinted in Arizona
Republic, July 7, 1986, at Cl.
4. See Dooley, supra note 1, at 18-19; Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of the Rules
Against Insider Trading, 13 HoFsr'A L. REv. 9, 60 (1984); Phillips and Zutz, The Insider Trading Doctrine: A Need for
Legislative Repair, 13 HoFns'A L. Rv. 65, 69 (1984); For the SEC, Developing Insider-Trading Cases is Frustrating
Work, Wall St. J., July 2, 1986, § 1, at 1; Is the SEC Big Enough for the Job?, supra note 1.
5. Carlton and Fischel, supra note 1, at 859 n. 12; Dooley, supra note 1, at 1, 7; Wall Street's Army of Insiders,
supra note 1; Is the SEC Big Enough for the Job?, supra note 1.
6. There is an enormous amount of scholarly writing concerning insider trading, some of which is cited in Carlton
and Fisehel, supra note 1, at 857 n. 1; in Haft, The Effect of Insider Trading Rules on the Internal Efficiency of the Large
Corporation, 80 MicH. L. REv. 1051, 1053 n.8 (1982); and in Macey, supra note 4, at 10 nn. 2 and 4.
7. According to Professor Scott, by 1980 there were approximately 180 judicial opinions dealing with insider
trading under Rule lOb-5. Scott, supra note 1. at 815. Since many cases settle during the trial and appellate process, and
since many court decisions do not result in reported opinions, this number is presumably only a small part of the litigation
activity concerning insider trading.
8. The SEC has the opportunity to influence policy in this area through its rule making and amendment powers,
through the enforcement positions it takes, through the advocacy of its appellate briefs, through speeches and articles of
its representatives, and through decisions that it makes in administrative proceedings brought before it.
9. See, e.g., Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984) (codified in
various subsections of 15 U.S.C. § 78); The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1983: Hearings on HR 559 Before the
Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 33
(1984); The Insider Trading Sanctions Act and SEC Enforcement Legislation: Hearings on HR 559 Before the
Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 19-20 (1983).
10. See, e.g., Dooley, supra note 1, at 1; Macey, supra note 4, at 11-12; Scott, supra note 1, at 804-05.
11. Compare SEC v. Materia, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 99,526 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
aff'd, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir.
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While the SEC and the federal courts clearly and uniformly answer this question
in favor of regulation (with the dissenting views coming from some in the academic
community),12 there are major disagreements among the SEC and the various federal
courts as to the scope and rationale of insider trading restrictions under Rule lOb-5.13
These disagreements are illustrated by the SEC and lower court efforts to read as
narrowly as possible those Supreme Court opinions that curtail the scope of the
insider trading restrictions,1 4 and by the Supreme Court's repeated rejection of the
view-formerly held by the SEC and at least some lower courts-that the use of any
material informational advantage in securities trading is actionable under Rule
1Ob-5.15 The result of these disagreements is a jurisprudence of insider trading that is
neither coherent nor predictable.
It is not surprising that disagreements should arise and continue regarding the
propriety, scope, and rationale of insider trading restrictions, since the SEC and the
courts that have developed the doctrine in this area have, being analytically bound as
they are to Section l0b 16 and Rule 10b-5,1 7 never had the freedom to analyze and
develop an optimal doctrinal position free of these restraints. For this reason, the
analytical underpinnings of restrictions on insider trading, if any, may not have been
fully explored by the judges and administrators who make policy in this area. The
purpose of this Article is to articulate a coherent policy basis for the regulation of
insider trading, one that is based on the notion of inside information as property' 8 that
can be owned and used by or for the benefit of the owner or creator of that property.
1981), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 193 (1983); O'Connor & Associates v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1179
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); SEC Exchange Act Release No. 17120, [1980 Transfer Binder] Fb. SEc. L. REP., (CCH) f 82,646
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Release No. 171201, with Carlton and Fisehel, supra note 1, and Easterbrook, supra note 2.
12. See supra note 11.
13. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); The Insider
Trading Sanctions Act of 1983: Hearings on HR 559 Before the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 11-31 (1984) (testimony of John Shad, Chairman of the
SEC); and supra note 11.
14. See, e.g., the cases cited supra note 11; Release No. 17120, supra note 11.
15. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654-55 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980).
16. Section 10b of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982), provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of... the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange- . . . (b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe
as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
17. Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-5 (1986), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange, (a) To employ any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as
a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
18. Others have suggested that inside information may be viewed as a form of property. See, e.g., Diamond v.
Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969); Carlton and Fischel, supra note 1, at 866; Dooley,
supra note 1, at 21, 64; Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 310, 331; Haft, supra note 6, at 1064 n.33; Macey, supra note 4,
at 12, 27-29, 36-39; Scott, supra note 1, at 814; Speech of SEC Commissioner Grundfest, reported in V. 18 BNA Src.
REO. & L. RuP. 935-36 (1986). The purpose of this Article is to demonstrate that a property rights approach to insider
trading regulation solves most, if not all, of the problems that courts and commentators have found in our present,
problematic insider trading doctrine, while at the same time responding adequately to the economic criticism leveled at
present insider trading doctrine.
INFRINGEMENT OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
This Article begins with a brief overview of the development of insider trading
restrictions under Rule lOb-5 and of certain of the analytical difficulties inherent in
the present doctrine in this area. The Article next articulates a proposed property
rights approach to the analysis of insider trading restrictions, and demonstrates how
such an approach resolves the analytical problems inherent in the present doctrine,
while at the same time serving to protect investors in accordance with the purpose of
the Securities Exchange Act. The Article then considers certain economic and other
arguments against the regulation of insider trading, and concludes that the proposed
property rights approach adequately deals with the concerns of the proponents of
those arguments. Finally, the Article considers whether the proposed approach can be
implemented under Section 10b and Rule lOb-5 or under state corporation law.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR CURRENT, PROBLEMATIC REGULATION OF INSIDER
TRADING
A. The Development of Restrictions on Insider Trading
At common law, there were few, if any, restrictions on trading on the basis of
inside information in market transactions.' 9 The early cases in this area held that it
was not a breach of any fiduciary duty to the corporation or its shareholders for an
insider to trade in the market on material, undisclosed information. 20 While there
were cases suggesting that the use of material, undisclosed information by a corporate
officer, director, or substantial shareholder could violate a fiduciary duty, and thus be
actionable under state corporate law,2 t those cases involved face-to-face transactions,
in which there was at least a substantial possibility of misrepresentations or partially
truthful statements. Some of those cases also involved "special" (i.e., egregious)
facts22 of a type possible only in face-to-face dealings.
Not until 1969 did a major court recognize that market trading by corporate
officers and directors on the basis of material, undisclosed information could
constitute a state law breach of corporate fiduciary duty. 23 Once recognized, this duty
was promptly repudiated, as a matter of state law, by a number of other courts. 24
Thus, state corporation and common law has never definitively proscribed insider
trading in market transactions (although some states now have securities laws or
"Blue Sky" provisions that attempt to implement this proscription). 25
A possible reaction to the failure of state common law to regulate insider trading
in the securities markets would be to conclude that such regulation was deemed to be
19. Freeman v. Deeio, 584 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1978); Carlton and Fischel, supra note 1, at 860 n.14, 889; Dooley,
supra note 1. at 46; Fischel, supra note 2, at 135.
20. See, e.g., Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933); and authorities cited supra note 19.
21. See Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909); Hotchkiss v. Fischer, 136 Kan. 530, 16 P.2d 531 (1932); W. CAY
AND M. EtsENBEIG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 714-16 (5th ed. 1980).
22. See supra note 21.
23. Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969).
24. Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1978); Schein v. Chasen, 313 So.2d 739 (Fla. 1975).
25. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE, § 25402 (\vest 1977).
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unwise and unnecessary by the courts (which refused to impose such regulation),2 6 by
the state legislatures (which at least initially failed to adopt regulatory legislation), 27
by the corporations in whose securities the trading took place (since they did not
adopt charter provisions forbidding insider trading),2 8 and by investors (since they
continued to participate in securities markets in which insider trading was present).
Indeed, as will be discussed more fully within,2 9 it has been forcefully argued that
insider trading provides benefits to the marketplace, by providing an indirect means
of information regarding corporate developments; to investors, by moving the
prevailing market prices in the proper direction; to corporate managers, by providing
them with a means of extraordinary compensation for their developmental efforts on
behalf of the enterprise; and to the corporation, by providing corporate shareholders
and managers with the benefits mentioned above. Thus, it is possible that the decision
of state policy makers to refrain from regulating insider trading was deliberately and
thoughtfully made.
That possibility did not deter Congress, however, from concluding that insider
trading in the securities markets was an evil in need of regulation. Faced with the
Great Depression that followed the 1929 stock market crash, Congress considered
and enacted broad and sweeping federal securities regulation, including the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.30 That statute, which was enacted to deal with a myriad of
securities abuses, included in Section 16 a provision that was designed by Congress
to deal with the congressionally identified problem of insider trading by regulating so
called "short-swing" trading by officers, directors, and ten percent shareholders of
publicly held corporations. 3t Section 16, which until the adoption in 1984 of the
Insider Trading Sanctions Act 32 was Congress' only enactment specifically concern-
ing insider trading, does not actually regulate the use of inside information; it simply
provides a mechanism for corporate recapture of profits made by certain corporate
insiders who engage in purchases and sales or sales and purchases of corporate
securities within a six month period.
Although Section 16 is Congress' specific response to the problem of insider
trading, 33 it is another section of the Securities Exchange Act-Section 1Ob-- 34 that
has formed the basis for most of the administrative and judicial attempts to regulate
actual insider trading. That section is a general anti-fraud provision that authorizes the
SEC to adopt rules and regulations designed to prevent manipulative and deceptive
conduct in the purchase and sale of securities. In the legislative history of the
Securities Exchange Act there is no indication that Congress intended to regulate
insider trading through Section 10b or, indeed, through any section other than Section
26. See supra notes 19 and 20.
27. Id.
28. See Carlton and Fischel, supra note 1, at 858, 866; Dooley, supra note 1, at 45-46; Easterbrook, supra note
2, at 333 n.103; Fischel, supra note 2, at 135.
29. See infra notes 192-205 and accompanying text.
30. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1982).
31. Id. at § 78p(b).
32. See supra note 9.
33. See Dooley, supra note 1, at 57; Phillips and Zutz, supra note 4, at 71.
34. See supra note 16.
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16. 35 Yet the SEC and the courts have used Section 10b (and Rule lOb-5 promulgated
thereunder) as their primary tools in the administrative and judicial war against
insider trading. As is discussed more fully within, Section 10b and Rule lOb-5 are not
necessarily well suited to this role since 1) Congress did not intend that statute to
apply to insider trading situations; 36 2) the SEC adopted Rule lOb-5 to deal with the
problem of affirmative misrepresentation, not the problem of non-disclosure in the
insider trading context;37 and 3) Section 10b and Rule lOb-5 are grounded on the
notion of fraud, 38 which (as defined by the Supreme Court in its recent insider trading
jurisprudence) 39 makes somewhat difficult, unpredictable, and perhaps irrational, the
determination of what sort of trading is in fact proscribed under Rule lOb-5 as
"insider trading." 40
Notwithstanding the apparent difficulties with grounding an administrative and
judicial doctrine of insider trading regulation on authorities as ill-suited as Section
10b and Rule lOb-5, the lower courts and the SEC proceeded to do just that.
Beginning in the mid-1940s, shortly after the SEC's adoption of that rule in 1942, the
SEC4' and a number of lower federal courts42 applied Rule lOb-5 to prohibit insider
trading in face-to-face transactions in which officers, directors, substantial share-
holders, or the corporation itself used undisclosed information regarding corporate
developments in their investment decisions. That an anti-fraud proscription such as
Rule lOb-5 should be applied in these face-to-face securities dealings between
corporate insiders and potential buyers or sellers of the corporation's securities is not
surprising, for, as indicated earlier, in such transactions there is a great potential for
misrepresentations to be made or for nondisclosure of certain information (known to
the insider) to render misleading other information43 or statements provided by the
insider to his seller or buyer. Rule 1 Ob-5 was adopted to deal with just this sort of
misrepresentation and half truth. 44
Because Rule lOb-5 and Section 10b were not specifically enacted to deal with
insider trading situations (in which the defendant, who allegedly possesses an
informational advantage, silently trades without making any statement or represen-
35. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980); Hearings Before the Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce on HR 7852 and HR 8720, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess., 115 (1934). See also Dooley, supra note 1, at
56-59; Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 319; Phillips and Zutz, supra note 4. at 72-73; Scott, supra note 1, at 803-04; Wang,
Trading on Material Nonpublic Information on Impersonal Stock Markets: Who is Harmed and Who Can Sue Whom
Under SEC Rule 0b-5, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 1217, 1224 (1981).
36. See supra note 35.
37. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); SEC Release No. 32307 Fed. Reg. 3804 (1942); Comments
of Milton V. Freeman, Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAw. 793, 922 (1967); Scott,
supra note I, at 802.
38. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980); Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); See supra notes 16 and 17.
39. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
40. See infra notes 79-81 and 115-17 and accompanying text.
41. See In re Ward La France Truck Co., 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943).
42. See, e.g., Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260 (Ist Cir. 1966); Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp.,
103 F. Supp. 954 (N.D, Ill. 1952); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951); Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947); R. JENrINs AND H. MAS, JR., SEcUrrms REGUL IO.,N-CASES AND
MATERAILS 912 (5th ed. 1982).
43. See R. JENINLS AND H. MARSH, supra note 42, at 912, 1008; note 36 supra.
44. See supra note 37.
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tation whatever), 45 it is surprising in hindsight that the lower courts chose to
announce the broad proposition that insider trading by corporate insiders is prohibited
by Rule lOb-5, whether or not that trading is accompanied by any misrepresentational
or half truthful statement. Yet this is what the courts did, in a number of cases
involving corporate insiders in face-to-face transactions, in opinions that were largely
devoid of forceful reasoning to support that broad proposition. Without a great deal
of analysis, 46 the lower courts concluded in these cases that insider trading was
generally a bad thing that ought to be prohibited by some federal statute or regulation.
Rule lOb-5 and Section 10b were the vehicles that allowed the lower courts to
implement this regulation.
While the use of Rule lOb-5 to regulate insider trading first arose in cases
involving face-to-face transactions, the language of the courts in those early opinions
and the attitude of the SEC were such that it was clearly forseeable that Rule lOb-5's
proscription on insider trading would not be confined to such cases. 47 Indeed, in 1961
the SEC clearly established its view that insider trading in impersonal market
transactions violates Rule lOb-5. In the famous Cady, Roberts decision,48 an
administrative decision of the SEC sanctioning a registered stock brokerage for
participating in insider trading in market transactions, the SEC rejected the argument
that Rule lOb-5 proscribed insider trading only in face-to-face transactions. 49
The decision of the SEC to apply Rule lOb-5's insider trading proscription to
market transactions was judicially confirmed just a few years later, in the famous case
of SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.50 That case (seeking injunctive and ancillary relief)
was brought by the SEC against a number of defendants, all of whom were officers,
directors, or employees of the corporation in whose securities they traded, in market
transactions, allegedly on the basis of material, undisclosed information regarding the
corporation's affairs. 5' The Second Circuit Court of Appeals concluded, without any
difficulty, that Rule lOb-5 proscribed insider trading in impersonal market transac-
tions.5 2
Thus, by 1968 the lower courts and the SEC had firmly established that Rule
lOb-5 proscribed insider trading in both face-to-face and market transactions. Indeed,
this SEC and lower-court-made doctrine remains so firmly established that neither
Congress nor the Supreme Court has had the temerity to challenge it5 3
45. See supra note 42.
46. See Scott, supra note 1, at 803-04; Dooley, supra note 1, at 39.
47. See R. JENNINGS AND H. MARSH, supra note 42, at 912.
48. In the Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
49. Id. at 910-12.
50. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
51. Id. at 839-41.
52. Id. at 864.
53. In Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), the Supreme Court relied heavily on lower court precedent
in concluding that insider trading is proscribed by Rule lOb-5. Id. at 226-29. In its deliberations leading up to the
enactment of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Congress considered the scope of the administratively and
judicially created restrictions on insider trading. See supra note 9. Congress declined, however, to give legislative
definition to the concept of insider trading, preferring to leave that definitional process to the courts and the SEC. Thus,
a good argument can be made that Congress has endorsed the scope of the judicially and administratively developed
insider trading doctrine. See, e.g., Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 360-67 (1982).
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What had not been decided in 1968 was what constitutes insider trading. As
previously indicated, the early insider trading cases under Rule 1Ob-5 all involved the
use of material, undisclosed information by the corporation or its officers, directors,
substantial shareholders, or employees. 54 Thus, although the courts did not always
recognize this fact, in all of these cases there was a relationship, direct or indirect,
between the defendant and the corporation in whose securities the trading occurred.
55
While the existence of such a relationship would later assume considerable impor-
tance in the Supreme Court's analysis and development of insider trading doctrine,
56
in the late 1960's and early 1970's the significance that the Supreme Court would
later place on that relationship was not fully appreciated by the SEC and the lower
courts.
Thus, having succeeded in establishing the propositions that Rule lOb-5
proscribes insider trading and that this proscription applies in both face-to-face and
market transactions, the SEC set out during the 1970's to establish a broad definition
of insider trading-one that would literally preclude the use of informational
advantages in securities trading transactions. 57 The SEC (aided at times by private
plaintiffs) set out to implement and enforce the pronouncement of the Second Circuit
in Texas Gulf Sulphur that "anyone in possession of material inside information must
either disclose it to the investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it . . . or
chooses not to do so, must abstain from trading in or recommending the securities
concerned while such inside information remains undisclosed." '5 8 This pronounce-
ment was, of course, gratuitously broad, since the defendants in Texas Gulf Sulphur
(like the defendants in the earlier cases) were not just "anyone"; they were all people
who, as officers, directors, and employees of Texas Gulf, had a relationship to that
corporation. 59
Notwithstanding indications that the courts would not tolerate an absolute
prohibition on the use of informational advantages 6° and warnings by influential
commentators that such an absolute prohibition was unwise, 61 the SEC proceeded to
take the position that anyone in possession of material, undisclosed information-
i.e., a person with an informational advantage-must either disclose that information
or refrain from trading or tipping on it. That position was taken most dramatically in
Chiarella v. United States,62 the case which ultimately afforded the Supreme Court
54. See supra notes 41-44, and accompanying text.
55. See R. Jviseras AND H. MARSH, supra note 42, at 912, 1008.
56. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
57. For a definition of "insider trading" that is consistent with this SEC approach (and that was formulated by a
leading commentator in 1980, prior to Chiarella and Dirks), see Dooley, supra note 1, at 3.
58. 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968).
59. Id. at 843-47.
60. See, e.g., SEC v. Great American Industries, Inc., 407 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 920
(1969); General Time Corp. v. Talley Industries, Inc., 403 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969);
Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967); Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J.
1955).
61. See Fleiseher, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information,
121 U. PA. L. REv. 798 (1973).
62. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
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its first opportunity to contribute to the jurisprudence concerning the regulation of
insider trading through Section 10b and Rule lOb-5.
In Chiarella, the defendant clearly benefitted from an informational advantage
that he had obtained in a most unseemly way. The defendant, who worked for a
financial printer, used his employment position to gain access to confidential
information regarding planned corporate takeover attempts. 63 He then used that
information to purchase securities of the target companies, prior to the public
announcement of the planned tenders. 64 Following such public announcements, he
sold those securities at a nice profit to himself.6 5 The unseemly nature of this conduct
was too much for the defendant's employer, which fired him, and for the SEC, which
brought a civil action against the defendant that resulted in the disgorgement of his
trading profits through a consent decree. 66
Notwithstanding the justice to which the defendant had already been brought by
his employer and the SEC's earlier civil action, the SEC made a criminal reference
of the case to the Justice Department for criminal prosecution. In that prosecution, the
government contended (and the district court instructed the jury) that the defendant
could be convicted of violating Rule lOb-5 if he traded on material, undisclosed
information. 67 Ignored by the government (at least until the last minute) and by the
district court was the fact that the defendant had no relationship with the target
corporations in whose securities he traded.6 8
In its first encounter with insider trading doctrine under Rule 1Ob-5, the Supreme
Court confirmed that insider trading is actionable under Rule lOb-5.6 9 It disavowed,
however, the notion that the Rule proscribes the use of any informational advantage.
Rather, the court said that Rule lOb-5 and Section 10b proscribe fraudulent conduct,
and that use of material, undisclosed information is only fraudulent when that use
violates a fiduciary or similar duty to the corporation in whose securities the trading
takes place (or to the shareholders of that corporation). 70
While the Supreme Court's actual holding in Chiarella has been the subject of
considerable debate 7l and is arguably very narrow, 72 it is clear that Chiarella 1)
confirms that Rule lOb-5 can be used as a regulator of insider trading; 73 2) rejects the
63. Id. at 224.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 224-25.
67. Id. at 235-36.
68. Id. at 232-33.
69. Id. at 225-26.
70. Id. at 227.
71. See, e.g., Aldave, Misappropriation: A General Theory of Liability for Trading on Nonpublic Information, 13
HoF SRA L. REv. 101 (1984); Anderson, Fraud, Fiduciaries, and Insider Trading, 10 Hotsm L. REv. 341 (1982);
Branson, Discourse on the Supreme Court Approach to SEC Rule lob-5 and Insider Trading, 30 E.oRY L.J. 263 (1981);
Heller, Chiarella, SEC Rule 14e-3 and Dirks: Fairness Versus Economic Theory, 37 Bus. LAw. 517 (1982); Langevoort,
Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70 CAUr. L. REv. 1 (1982); Macey, supra
note 4; Morgan, The Insider Trading Rules After Chiarella: Are They Consistent with Statutory Policy?, 33 HASmNs L.
J. 1407 (1982).
72. See United States v. Winans, 612 F. Supp. 827, 838-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), modified sub nom. United States
v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S.Ct. 666 (Jan. 15, 1987)(No. 86-422); Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222, 243 n.4 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Release No. 17120, supra note 11.
73. 445 U.S. 222, 225 (1980).
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view that all informational advantages are proscribed under Rule lOb-5;74 and 3)
emphasizes the importance of fiduciary and similar relationships in determining
liability for insider trading under Rule lOb-5. 75 This emphasis was based on the
Court's view that Section 10b and the rules thereunder can only proscribe fraud;76 that
trading in silence (which is the usual situation in insider trading cases involving
market transactions) is only fraudulent if there is a duty to speak;77 and that such a
duty arises from a fiduciary or similar relationship between the defendant and the
corporation in whose securities he or she trades. 78
In this analysis, the Supreme Court relied heavily upon common law notions of
fraud. 79 Also, in its analysis the Court left open the possibility that the breach by the
defendant of a duty to someone other than the corporation might support a finding of
liability under Rule lOb-5 in insider trading cases.80 The Court did not consider this
possibility in Chiarella, for the government constructed very late (and the jury never
had a chance to consider) the argument that Mr. Chiarella had acted fraudulently (and
in breach of a duty to his employer and his employer's clients) when he stole
confidential information from his employer and those clients. 8'
The ink on the Chiarella decision was hardly dry, as Harold Marsh has said, 82
before the SEC and the lower courts set out to undo it. The first assault came from
the SEC,83 which promptly adopted new Rule 14e-3 84 (under the authority of Section
14e of the Securities Exchange Act)85 for the purpose of prohibiting conduct of the
type in which Mr. Chiarella had engaged and which had been found by the Supreme
Court to be outside the scope of Rule lOb-5. Rule 14e-3, which is discussed more
fully below,86 applies only to the use of undisclosed information in connection with
tender offers, since Section 14e is limited in its application to tender offer
situations. 87 Notwithstanding that limitation on Rule 14e-3's application, the author-
ity of the SEC to adopt this rule and the rule's validity remain very questionable, 88
74. Id. at 233.
75. Id. at 232-33.
76. Id. at 232.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 227-28.
80. Id. at 235-36.
81. Id.
82. See R. JUNINGS AsN H. MARSH, supra note 42, at 919.
83. See Release No. 17120, supra note 11.
84. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1986).
85. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982), provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state any material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they are made,
not misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with
any tender offer or request, or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of security holders in opposition to or
in favor of any such offer, request,or invitation. The Commission shall, for the purposes of this subsection, by
rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts and practices as are
fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.
86. See infra notes 230-36 and accompanying text.
87. See supra note 63.
88. See, e.g., Heller, supra note 58, at 541-45; Phillips, Insider Trading Liability After Dirks, 16 REv. SEc. ReG.
841, 847-48 (1983); Phillips and Zutz, supra note 4, at 95-96. But see SEC v. Musella, 578 F. Supp. 425, 443-44
(S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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particularly in light of recent Supreme Court pronouncements regarding the purpose
and application of Section 14e. 89 Enforcement by the SEC of the rule as written has
not been deterred, however, by doubts about the rule's validity or wisdom. 90
In addition to promulgating Rule 14e-3, the SEC responded to the Chiarella
decision by noting the narrowness of the Supreme Court's holding in Chiarella and
by promptly addressing the issue left open by the Supreme Court-whether the
breach of a duty to someone else in connection with the defendant's use of
undisclosed, material information can support a finding of "fraud" and the
conclusion that Rule lOb-5 has thus been violated.9 1 The government argued this
position successfully before the Second Circuit in United States v. Newman,92 in
which the court sustained criminal indictments against defendants who, like Mr.
Chiarella, had used confidential information stolen from their employers to trade in
securities of corporations to which the defendants had no relationship. 93 The Second
Circuit concluded that this sort of insider trading was actionable under Rule lOb-5,
even though there was no relationship between the defendants and the corporation in
whose securities they traded, because the use by the defendants of confidential
information breached a duty to their employer (and to the employer's clients) and
therefore constituted a fraud for purposes of Rule lOb-5. 9 4 Even though the Second
Circuit has refused to extend this approach to cases initiated by private litigants,95 the
Newman case illustrates the desire of the lower courts to broadly read and apply Rule
lOb-5 in insider trading cases, and to read narrowly the Supreme Court's analysis in
Chiarella.
Perhaps because it recognized such a disposition on the part of some or all of the
lower courts, the Supreme Court took great pains in the recent case of Dirks v. SEC96
to reiterate the views announced in Chiarella: that Section 10b and Rule lOb-5 can
only apply to fraudulent conduct; that silently trading on an informational advantage
is not fraudulent absent a duty to disclose; that a duty to disclose arises only from a
relationship of trust and confidence between the defendant and the corporation; and
that absent such a duty, the defendant's trading is not actionable under Rule 1Ob-5. 97
The Court's opinion in Dirks also contains language, 98 however, that has been
construed by the SEC and some commentators to indicate that the Court does not
really mean that a duty to disclose arises only from such a relationship. 99 Such
language, it is argued, indicates that the Court has not rejected the notion that trading
89. Sehreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985).
90. See SEC v. Musella, 578 F. Supp. 425, 443-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); SEC v. Wallis [ 1984 Transfer Binder] Fm.
SEc. L. RaP. (CCH) 91,562 (1984); 18 SEc. REG. L. RaP. 709, 793 (BNA) (1986) (recounting the SEC's enforcement
action under Rule 14e-3 against investment banker Dennis Levine).
91. Release No. 17120, supra note 11.
92. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 193 (1983).
93. Id. at 19.
94. Id.
95. Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 22 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984).
96. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
97. Id. at 654-55.
98. Id. at 665.
99. See, e.g., Aldave, supra note 71, at 102 n.6.
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on misappropriated or stolen information, in breach of a duty to someone other than
the corporation, constitutes fraudulent conduct that is actionable under Rule 1Ob-5. 10
Though the Court's opinion in Dirks went to some length to reaffirm the
principles announced in Chiarella, Dirks and Chiarella are factually dissimilar cases.
As indicated earlier,10! Chiarella involved insider trading by a defendant who had
stolen information from his employer who, in turn, had no relationship to the
corporation in whose securities the trading occurred.102 Dirks involved a securities
analyst who concluded, after a lengthy investigation of a company (which included
interviews with present and former officials of that company), that the company was
engaged in a massive fraud. 0 3 The analyst then precipitated the revelation of that
fraud by recommending that his clients dispose of the company's securities, which
led to a market decline, which led the SEC and the exchange to stop trading and
investigate the company's circumstances.' o4 In Chiarella, therefore, there was no
relationship between the defendant and the corporation in whose securities he traded.
In Dirks, there was an indirect relationship; the defendant, Dirks, was a tippee of a
corporate insider who had a relationship with the corporation, which the tippee
allegedly inherited when he received the tip from the insider. 0 5
While the lower courts, prior to Dirks, had fairly well established that tippees
and tippers could be equally liable under Rule 1Ob-5,106 the Supreme Court in Dirks
was not willing to impose this liability on the securities analyst who had revealed this
massive fraud. Because of its regard for the important role that securities analysts
play in bringing information to the marketplace and the important role that Dirks
played in revealing this fraud, the court rejected the view that a tippee (such as Dirks)
should always be liable for trading on inside information received from a person (such
as a present or former officer of the company) who has a relationship with the
corporation. 0 7 Rather, the Court structured a two-part test for tippee liability,
designed to permit the continued methods of investment analysts, under which
liability for insider trading under Rule lOb-5 will be imposed only if 1) the
insider/tipper violated a fiduciary duty in disclosing the information to the tippee, and
2) the tippee knew or had reason to know that the disclosure of the information to him
or her was in violation of such a duty. '0 8
Because Dirks' tipper had disclosed the fraud to Dirks for altruistic reasons-to
end the company's misconduct-rather than for personal gain or benefit, the Court
concluded that he had not violated a duty in making this disclosure to Dirks. 10 9 Since
100. Id.
101. See supra notes 62-82 and accompanying text.
102. 445 U.S. 222, 224 (1980).
103. 463 U.S. 646, 648-50 (1983).
104. Id. at 649.
105. Id.
106. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974); R. JENNINGS
AND H. MARSH, supra note 42, at 914-15.
107. 463 U.S. 646, 665-67 (1983).
108. Id. at 657-58.
109. Id. at 667.
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the tipper was in violation of no duty, the tippee, Dirks, did not violate Rule lOb-5
when he received and acted on the information.
While Chiarella and Dirks are factually dissimilar cases, there are of course
some similarities in the Court's resolution of the cases. In neither case did the Court
consider the wisdom, under economic theory or otherwise, of regulating insider
trading."l 0 Rather, in both cases the Court, relying heavily on lower court precedent,
concluded that Rule 1Ob-5 had been firmly established as a regulator of insider
trading."' In both cases the Court emphasized the "fraud" language of Section 10b
and Rule lOb-5 and looked to the common law of fraud in defining the parameters of
insider trading regulation under Rule 1Ob-5.112 In both cases the Court reached a just
and equitable result in letting the defendants off. (Chiarella, who was the first person
ever prosecuted for insider trading, had already been sanctioned by his employer and
by the SEC;113 Dirks' activitity resulted in the discovery and termination of a major
fraud.)' 14
However, in reaching these just results, the Court's statutory and common lav
fraud analysis did little to advance the understanding of the principles underlying
insider trading regulation or to improve the coherence and workability of the insider
trading regulations. By focusing on common law fraud, on fiduciary duties to
ill-defined persons or entities, and on the motives of tippers and knowledge of
tippees, the Court contributed to the continuing uncertainty concerning the justifica-
tion and the application of the insider trading rules.
B. Problems with the Present Restrictions on Insider Trading
That the Supreme Court did not consider the wisdom of insider trading
regulation and that it did consider fraud and fiduciary duty principles is, of course,
not necessarily its fault. The Supreme Court, like the lower courts before it, felt
constrained to follow the language of a statute and rule that were assumed to apply
to insider trading. This judicial attitude-of accepting the applicability of Section lOb
and Rule lOb-5 and then limiting analysis to the language of those provisions-has
led to a major problem in the insider trading area. Even if one accepts the notion that
insider trading should be regulated, it is very hard to tell which transactions will be
subject to that regulation, since under Rule lOb-5 that depends on the existence of
fiduciary (and other ill-defined) duties that run to persons who are not very clearly
defined and on motivations, states of mind and knowledge that are very subjective
and not easy to identify in the planning stage.
But this is not the only problem with the present use of Section 10b and Rule
lOb-5 as a regulator of insider trading. Because of the Court's view that insider
trading liability under that Rule depends on the existence and breach of a fiduciary
duty to the corporation, Rule lOb-5 regulates insider trading by some but fails to
110. See Fisehel, supra note 2.
111. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 225-30 (1980); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653-58 (1983).
112. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227-30 (1980); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653-58 (1983).
113. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 224-25 (1980).
114. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 650 (1983).
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regulate insider trading by others whose conduct is equally reprehensible (or at least
no more morally justified)." 15 For example, an employee of Company A who trades
in securities of Company B, which is about to receive a yet undisclosed lucrative
contract with Company A, is not neccessarily subject to insider trading liability under
Rule lOb-5, since he or she has no relationship to the company in whose securities
he or she traded. 116 On the other hand, the Company B officer who trades in securities
of that company on the basis of that undisclosed information concerning the contract
will have liability under the Rule, since he or she clearly has the requisite
relationship.
Yet, the conduct of these persons appears equally justified or unjustified. In both
cases the person used inside information for his or her benefit. In both cases the
person took that information from an enterprise for whose benefit the information was
intended. In neither case did the person create the information or receive permission
to trade from the information's creator. Thus, if one is to be sanctioned for insider
trading (or allowed to insider trade), so should the other. However, because of the
fraud language" 7 of the statute and rule and the Supreme Court's common
law/fiduciary duty approach to the implementation of that language, one defendant
may be able to trade while the other clearly may not.
Other problems also exist with the use of Section 10b and Rule lOb-5 as the
primary federal regulator of insider trading. These provisions, like most of the
provisions of the federal securities laws, may be enforced by the SEC.' 18 The SEC,
having been authorized to enforce these provisions and having determined that insider
trading is a very bad thing, has committed substantial resources to this enforcement
effort."t 9 However, because of the extent of the insider trading "problem"1 2 0 and
because of the relatively limited resources of the SEC, there is a serious question as
to whether the SEC's resources should be employed in this way. ' 2' An insider trading
regulatory scheme (either under or outside of Rule IOb-5) that freed the SEC from this
enforcement role would allow the SEC to reallocate its resources to other, perhaps
more productive, purposes. Such a scheme would rely for its enforcement on private
enterprise, rather than on the SEC.
115. Of course, Rule 14e-3 may cover tender offer related conduct that is outside the ambit of Section l0b and Rule
lOb-5. See supra notes 82-90 and accompanying text, and infra notes 230-36. See also infra note 236.
116. Such an employee might, however, have Rule lOb-5 liability under the theory of United States v. Newman,
664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), which is discussed in the text accompanying notes 90-96 supra. The Supreme Court has yet
to rule on this theory.
117. Actually. § 10b says nothing about fraud, and Rule lOb-5 is not by its terms limited to fraudulent conduct.
However, the Supreme Court has interpreted the statute to proscribe only fraudulent conduct. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S.
680, 701-02 (1980); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980); Santa Fe Industries Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S.
462, 478-80 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 215 (1976). Because the Rule cannot exceed the bounds
of the statute under which it was created, Rule lOb-5 is also limited to fraudulent conduct. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 215 (1976).
118. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21, 15 U.S.C. § 78u (1982).
119. See supra note 4.
120. See supra note 5.
121. For an argument that the cost of enforcement of the insider trading restrictions should not be borne by the
taxpayers, see Macey, supra note 4, at 58-61.
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Of course, the courts and the SEC already depend to considerable extent on
private litigation for help in enforcing the federal securities laws.' 2 2 Even where
Congress provided no private right of action under those statutes, the courts have
often implied such a right, 23 to enable private plaintiffs to supplement the SEC's
enforcement efforts, on the theory (among others) that such a supplement was
necessary to support the meager, beleaguered SEC staff.124 Such a private right of
action has been implied by the lower courts and recognized by the Supreme Court
under Rule lOb-5. t25
A private right of action under Rule lOb-5 causes other analytical and practical
problems with the use of this Rule as a regulator of insider trading. Because Section
10b and Rule lOb-5 prohibit manipulative and deceptive conduct "in connection with
the purchase and sale of any security," 126 the Supreme Court has held that plaintiffs
in a private lawsuit under Rule 1Ob-5 must be purchasers or sellers of securities. 127
This means that in many cases the person or enterprise from which inside information
has been taken, for the personal trading benefit of the defendant, will be unable to
bring a cause of action against the defendant under Rule lOb-5,t 28 since that person
or enterprise will not necessarily be a purchaser or seller of securities.
2 9
While limiting private plaintiffs under Rule 1Ob-5 to purchasers and sellers of
securities was intended to reasonably curtail the scope of a potentially enormous
plaintiff class,130 in the insider trading area (as opposed to other applications of Rule
lOb-5) this curtailment does not necessarily operate reasonably. Because it is very
difficult in market transactions to determine the actual purchasers and sellers whose
securities changed hands,' 3 ' many lower courts have granted standing to sue under
Rule lOb-5 to all market participants who engaged in transactions opposite to those
of the defendant between the time of the defendant's trade and the time of the
effective dissemination of the inside information. ' 32 Since the number of such traders
122. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, §§ I1 and 12, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k and 1 (1982); Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 88 16, 18, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78p and r (1982).
123. See, e.g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380-81 n.10 (1983); Merrill, Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 381 (1982); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S.
11, 18-19 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 570-71 (1979); Cannon v. University of Chicago,
441 U.S. 677, 688 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting); Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 47 (1977); Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 80 (1975); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers
Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13, n.9 (1971); J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
124. J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964). The court's reasoning in Borak is now largely discredited
by later cases. See, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 577; Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441
U.S. 677, 735-36 (Powell, J., dissenting).
125. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380-81 n.10 (1983).
126. See supra notes 16 and 17.
127. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 733-34 (1975). Blue Chip Stamps adopted the
so-called Birnbaum doctrine, established in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 956 (1952). For a discussion of some of the judicially created exceptions to the Birnbaum rule, see R. JEaNS
AN H. MARSH, supra note 42, at 1004-08.
128. Of course, such a person might proceed on other theories, such as state law breach of fiduciary duty, conversion
or theft. See infra notes 211-28 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 16 and 17; Dooley, supra note 1, at 21.
130. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 754-55 (1975).
131. See Wang, supra note 35; Karjala, Statutory Regulation of Insider Trading in Impersonal Markets, 1982 DurE
L.J. 627.
132. See, e.g., Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980); Shapiro v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce,
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and the volume of their transactions during that period is potentially huge, an insider
trader who is liable to all of them faces potentially "draconian" damages,
disproportionate to the profits that he or she made and to the effect that his or her
transactions had on the market.133
Because of this problem of potentially draconian damages against insider trading
defendants, some courts have refused to find any causal connection between the
defendant's trading and the plaintiff's alleged loss. 134 Other lower courts, however,
have said that the materiality of the omitted, inside information is sufficient to
presumptively establish the required causal link between the defendant's insider
trading and whatever harm the plaintiffs allegedly suffered. ' 35 For these courts, there
remains the problem of how to deal with the potential for draconian damages, which
they do by artificially limiting the total damage award to the amount of profit realized
by the defendant. 136
As applied to plaintiffs who were market participants, this limitation on damages
makes little sense. 137 If those participants have been damaged by the defendant's
insider trading, they should receive their actual damages, 38 which might be
measured in a variety of ways. 139 If they have not been injured, they should not
receive damages. ' 40 Awarding them the defendant's insider trading profits, which are
not the same as the losses suffered by the plaintiff/market participants, 141 accom-
plishes nothing other than forcing the defendant to disgorge his or her profit.
Even if profit disgorgement is the goal, it is not at all clear that the disgorged
profits should wind up in the hands of the plaintiff/market participants. 142 To the
extent that the disgorged profits do not recompense those market participants for
damage suffered by them, they have no logical claim to those profits. If profit
disgorgement is the goal, it would be better to have the insider trader return his or her
profits to the corporation, as is the case under Section 16b.
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974); R. JENNiNGS A.ND H. MARSH, supra note 41, at 1122. But see Fridrich
v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977).
133. See supra note 132.
134. Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 323 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977).
135. Shapiro v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 239-40 (2d Cir. 1974).
136. See, e.g., Securities and Exchange Commission v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47 (lst Cir. 1983); Elkind v. Liggett
& Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 173 (2d Cir. 1980). See also PROPOSED FED. SEc. CODE, §§ 1603, 1703(b), 1708(b) and
1711(j) (1978).
137. For the argument that it is sensible to allow the owner of the usurped information to recover the defendant's
trading profits, see infra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
138. See Securities Exchange Act § 28a, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (1982).
139. See, e.g., Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980); PROPOsED FED. SEC. CODE, §§ 1703(b),
1708(b) (1978); R. Jamixss AND H. MARSH, supra note 42, at 1122-24.
140. See infra notes 192-205 and accompanying text.
141. See R. JEaNos AND H. MARSH, supra note 42, at 1121, 1123-24.
142. If disgorgement of the defendant's profits is the goal, it would seem more appropriate for those profits to go
to the corporation, in whose securities the trading took place, as is the case under § 16b, or to the government as a fine
or penalty, as is the case under the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §
21(d)(2)(A)). To provide these profits to market participants, many of whom have not been injured and none of whom
can measure their loss by the defendant's profits, is not a good alternative, whether that is done directly, or indirectly
through disgorgement into an SEC fund for the benefit of market participants. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446
F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
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Analytically serious as these standing, causation and damage limitation prob-
lems are, there is an even more serious problem with the current use of Rule lOb-5
to regulate insider trading. As discussed in Part III, under Rule lOb-5 the plaintiffs
in private insider trading litigation are usually market participants who have not been
harmed by the insider trading 43 (since they would have traded even if the insider had
stayed out of the market) and who may have benefitted from that insider trading
(since purchases by an insider often move the market price up and sales by an insider
often move the market price down). Plaintiffs who sell in a market in which insider
buying has increased the market price, or who buy in a market in which insider selling
has decreased the market price, have little to complain about. 44 Accordingly, a
fundamental problem with the present use of Section 10b and Rule lOb-5 as the
regulator of insider trading is that the wrong people are allowed to bring claims under
this regulation.
For the reasons indicated, insider trading regulation under Rule lOb-5 has thus
far been an analytical failure. Perhaps because of the unpredictability and sometime
irrationality of the present doctrine, insider trading regulation has also been a
practical failure. A proposal to provide a coherent, rational, and predictable doctrine
in this area follows in the next part.
I. INSIDER TRADING AND PROPERTY
Because many of the difficulities with our present regulation of insider trading
arise from the courts' inability or reluctance to move beyond the language of the
statute and rule to a consideration of the overall wisdom of this regulation, this part
sets forth a model of insider trading regulation that may or may not be consistent with
the language of Section 10b and Rule lOb-5. After demonstrating that the proposed
model solves the analytical problems previously identified and is consistent with
economic theory regarding insider trading regulation, the article returns in Part IV to
the question of whether the proposal can be implemented under that section and rule
without new legislative authority.
A. Information as an Asset
Information can be an asset. 145 Like other assets, it can be developed by the
work of its creator, who may have engaged in an analysis of publicly available
information and in an investigation to reach conclusions or gather facts that are not
generally known, or who may have participated in the discovery or development of
new products, procedures, or projects that are as yet generally unknown. Like other
assets, information can sometimes be transferred by its owner to other persons, either
by purchase, by gift, as compensation for services rendered, through a temporary use
143. See infra notes 192-205 and accompanying text; Dooley, supra note 1, at 21; Fischel, supra note 2, at 889;
Macey, supra note 4, at 47-48.
144. For an interesting, theoretical argument that many (often unidentifiable) persons are injured by insider trading
in market transactions, see Wang, supra note 71, and Karjala, supra note 131.
145. See supra note 18. See generally Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable Information, 9 J. LEoAL
STD. 683 (1980).
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(i.e., licensing) arrangement or otherwise. So long as the information remains
generally unknown, the information has potential value in the hands of the person
who possesses it and who has the potential ability to benefit from the informational
advantage that he or she possesses. It is this potential value that provides the incentive
for the owner of the information to develop it and to keep it undisclosed, where
nondisclosure will maximize the best interest of the information's owner.
It is no big surprise that information can be an asset of potentially enormous
value to its owner. Business enterprises and their employees and agents routinely
recognize and deal with this fact in their dealings with ownership and use rights in
trade secrets, copyrights, patents, and other forms of what is called "intellectual
property" (which is simply information developed by or for a person whose rights in
that "property" will be respected). In those dealings, it is not uncommon for the
enterprise and its agents to agree on the allocation of ownership rights of the agent's
creations while in the employ of the enterprise; on the agent's rights to compensation
for those creations; on the agent's right to disclose or make use of information
regarding that creation, both during and after the termination of his or her
employment; and on other matters. Thus, dealing with information as an asset and
allocating its ownership and the uses to which it may be put is not necessarily novel
to many businesses.
If information can be an asset whose ownership can be determined and
transferred and whose uses can be allocated and restricted by agreement with the
owner, it is possible to approach the regulation of insider trading as a matter of
determining and protecting the ownership and use rights in the inside information on
which that trading is based.146 If such an approach proves analytically sound, as a
matter of property law, while protecting investors and overcoming the analytical
problems with the present regulatory system identified in Part I and Part III, it will
have much to commend it. Let us see if this approach can fill that large bill.
B. Ownership and Use of Corporate Information
One type of inside information on which people trade concerns the enterprise
itself. New assets are discovered, developed, or acquired in favorable ways that
benefit the company. Existing assets are lost or disposed of in ways unfavorable to
the company. The company proposes to acquire another enterprise in a friendly or
unfriendly acquisition. Key personnel decide to join, to stay with, or to leave the
company. The company is about to enter into a favorable contract with another
enterprise. The results of the company's operations for a given period are computed
and show a loss, rather than the expected profit, or a profit, rather than the expected
loss. Because of a change in accounting policy, the company plans to revalue some
of its assets and/or restate earnings for prior periods. New claims against the company
are investigated. In all of these situations, the information arises from and concerns
the company's activities.
146. See supra note 18.
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However, because companies are nothing more than aggregations of people and
assets, the matters described in the preceding paragraph will necessarily have been
accomplished for the company by individuals acting on its behalf. Those individuals
will, of course, know about those matters and accomplishments concerning the
company and may wish to trade in securities of the company based on that
knowledge. The question in this situation is whether they should be able to so trade.
If the activity of the person in developing new assets, making acquisition plans,
and handling other business matters was undertaken on behalf of the corporation, it
seems clear that the information regarding the matter is not that of the corporate
agent. That information belongs to the corporation, for which the activity was
undertaken. If this is the case, whether the corporate agent (or anybody else) can trade
on the information depends on whether the corporation, which owns the information,
consents in some way for that information to be used by the other person.147
The corporation's consent to the use by others of corporate information could be
given by contract, as in the case of an agreement between the corporation and an
employee, entered into at the time of his or her employment, permitting the use in
trading of certain types of information developed by (or known to) the employee; by
company policy, which might permit all officers above a certain rank to trade in
company securities (on information known to them) as part of their compensation
arrangements; 148 or on a case-by-case basis, where it appears that the corporation's
best interests would be served by, for example, letting an arbitrageur know of (and
trade on) the company's planned takeover of another enterprise so that the
arbitrageur's "warehousing" activities could assist the company in that takeover
effort. 149 No matter what form the corporation's consent takes, however, it is clear
that that consent must be given by the person or body that is authorized to exercise
the corporation's consent on such matters.
Normally, that body will be the board of directors, which under state corporation
law is usually authorized to manage the business, affairs, and assets of the
corporation. 150 Since such assets can include information, the use and management
of that asset should be under the direction of the board, unless the board decides to
delegate the authority to deal with such asset to a specific officer or committee of the
corporation. 151
In directing the business, affairs, and assets of the corporation, the board of
directors, committees thereof, and corporate officers have a state law fiduciary duty
to the corporation and all of the shareholders to act in the best interests of the
enterprise. 152 Thus, in deciding how to deal with undisclosed information that the
corporation possesses and owns, the board (or its delegate, if any) must determine
147. See Fisehel, supra note 2, at 136.
148. See infra notes 206-10 and accompanying text.
149. For a discussion of "warehousing," see Dooley, supra note 1, at 53; Fleischer, Mundheim and Murphy, supra
note 61, at 811-12.
150. See, e.g., MODEL. BussNtss CORPORATION Acr, § 8.01 (1984).
151. Id., §§ 8.41, 8.25.
152. Id., § 8.30.
[Vol. 48:79
INFRINGEMENT OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
that the contemplated action with respect to that information will serve the
corporation's best interests.
This requirement of promoting the best interests of the corporation in any
decision respecting the use (or nonuse) of corporate inside information differs
radically from practice under the present doctrine. Because it is impossible under
present doctrine for a director or other corporate officer to legitimize by consent an
otherwise illegitimate use of inside information, 53 directors, committees, or autho-
rized officers are rarely asked to determine if the corporate best interest would be
served by a proposed use of inside information concerning the corporation. Rather,
users of inside information employ that information (either legitimately or illegiti-
mately, depending on relational and other factors) for their own benefit and without
regard to the corporation's best interests. Those who complain about that use of inside
information are typically the SEC or other market participants, who often have not
been harmed directly by the insider trading 154 and whose enforcement activities are
not necessarily undertaken with a view to the best interests of the corporation in
whose securities the insider trading occurred.
Since the corporation whose information has been taken has a larger interest in
the use of that information than does a market participant,155 who would have traded
even in the absence of insider trading and probably at a worse price, it makes sense
to adopt a system of insider trading regulation that at some stage focuses on the
interests of the corporation. By treating inside information as corporate property to be
managed by or under the direction of the board, that focus is implemented.
In considering the question of how the use of inside information might further
the best interests of the corporation, the board or its delegate might conclude that no
person should use that information, because such use would make more difficult a
transaction that the corporation has in mind 5 6 (e.g., insider buying might drive up the
market price of the corporation's securities, thereby making more difficult the
corporation's acquisition in a transaction that is tied to the market price of the
corporation's securities), or because such use by individuals of undisclosed corporate
information may taint the corporation's reputation for fairness and integrity, 157 or
because the corporation wishes to use the inside information itself in its own activities
for the benefit of all of the corporation's shareholders. 15 8 Indeed, as discussed
below, 159 in cases in which the board or its delegate has not affirmatively approved
a person's use of corporate inside information, such use should be improper.
It would be possible, however, for the board or its delegate to determine in
certain circumstances that authorizing others to use corporate inside information
153. See SEC v. Pearson, 426 F.2d 1339 (10th Cir. 1970); SEC v. Kalvex, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 310 (S.D.N.Y.
1975); Fisehel, supra note 2, at 136.
154. See infra notes 193-205 and accompanying text.
155. See Dooley, supra note I, at 21.
156. See, e.g., Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (1949).
157. See United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 193 (1983); Diamond v.
Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969).
158. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (1969), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
159. See infra notes 211-16 and accompanying text.
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would be in the best interests of the corporation. As discussed in Part III, insider
trading points the market in the proper direction-the one that it will take when full
disclosure is made.' 6° Thus, if disclosure is presently impossible, for example,
because of the preliminary nature of the information or because of a corporate need
for secrecy, authorizing certain persons to trade will move the market in the proper
direction, thereby indirectly informing the market of the corporate development and
reducing the difference between the current value of the securities and their
post-disclosure value. Thus, since insider trading may be beneficial to the corpora-
tion's shareholders,' 6' the board may choose to authorize it.
The board or its delegate might also decide that allowing specific employees to
trade on inside information, such as that relating to corporate developments generated
by them, would be good compensation for their efforts on behalf of the corpora-
tion.1 62 Such a decision that this form of "compensation" is in the best interests of
the corporation could only be made by the directors, obviously, where those
developments were positive; where the inside information is that the managers have
run the corporation into the ground, the directors could not decide (consistent with
their duty to the corporation) 63 to reward those managers by letting them trade on
that inside information.
A decision by the board or its delegate to "tip" inside corporate information to
certain outsiders, to facilitate trading by them, could also be in the best interests of
the corporation. For example, where the corporation has received valuable services
from an outsider, one way of providing indirect compensation for those services is by
providing the outsider with the authorized use of inside information owned by the
corporation. Thus, if one accepts the notion that inside information is property of the
corporation, even the tipping of that information to others ought not be regarded as
improper, if the board of directors or other authorized corporate decision maker has
determined that such tipping is in the best interests of the corporation.
Where, however, that board or decision maker has not determined that the use
of inside information by an insider or outsider is in the corporation's best interests,
the use of such corporate information should be prohibited. As discussed in Part IV,
with respect to employees and agents of the corporation, in these circumstances their
duty of loyalty to the corporation should prevent the usurpation and use (whether as
traders or tippers) of corporate information, under the corporate opportunity doctrine
or under the theory of theft or conversion of corporate assets.t64 With respect to
persons who are not employees or agents of the corporation, where no authorization
to use the information has been given by the corporation, such persons either will
have stolen the information from the corporation or 165 have been given the
160. See infra notes 192-205 and accompanying text.
161. See Dooley, supra note 1, at 4, 33, 36, 55, 68; Fischel, supra note 2, at 129; Macey, supra note 4, at 15.
162. See Carlton and Fisehel, supra note 1, at 858, 876; Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 332; Scott, supra note 1, at
808. See infra notes 206-10 and accompanying text.
163. See MoDEL BusiNEss COloRAloN Act § 8.30 (1984).
164. See infra notes 211-16 and accompanying text.
165. A burglar or industrial spy who overcomes the corporation's effort to keep its information secret would fall in
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information by an insider who was not authorized to use it for that purpose. 166 In
either case, the person should not be permitted to trade on the information, for the
retention and use of stolen property is inconsistent with the criminal law, and, under
property law, the receipt of property from an unauthorized, untitled person conveys
to the recipient no title to, or authority to use, the property so received.
Since the key to the analysis of when and by whom corporate information can
be used is the corporation's consent, based upon the decision of the board of directors
or other authorized decision maker that such use is in the corporation's best interest,
the role of the board can not be over-emphasized. In making this decision, or
delegating to others the authority to make it, the board must act in the best interests
of the enterprise and of all of its shareholders.1 67 If the board does not do that, or if
it acts unreasonably, it can be held accountable to the corporation and its shareholders
for breach of duty to the corporation.
C. Ownership and Use of Analytical Information
While the foregoing discussion deals with the common situation in which the
inside information arises from and concerns activities and developments of the
corporation itself, not all inside information arises in that way. Some inside
information is created by outsiders, people who have no employee or agency
relationship to the corporation to which the information relates. For example, analysts
study the performance of selected companies in a variety of waysl 6 8-by reviewing
all of the publicly available financial and other reports on the company, by observing
the market performance of the company's securities, by observing company
operations and facilities, by talking to company employees and contractors -and use
these studies to draw conclusions as to the desirability of investing in the company's
securities. Even though much of that analysis will be based on publicly available
information, some of the information (such as interviews with company officials,
which are consistent with fiduciary duties if authorized by the company), t 69 the
this category; an analyst who observed the corporation's normal activities would not, for the corporation, by conducting
those activities in the open, has tacitly authorized their use in investment decisions.
166. An eavesdropper who overhears a private, corporate conversation would fall into this category, as would a
person who is tipped to a new corporate product by his brother-in-law, who is a machinist down at the plant. An analyst
who interviews company employees would not fall into this category, so long as those employees were authorized,
actually or apparently, to provide information to analysts.
167. MoDEL BusiEss CORMoRA oNAcr § 8.30 (1984).
168. See Fischel, supra note 2; Comment, An Examination of Investment Analyst Liability Under Rule lOb-5, 1984
ARz. ST. L. J. 129.
169. Where an analyst gains information about the company from people who have been authorized (expressly or
by past practice) to give it, neither the analyst nor the provider of the information has done anything wrong. Similarly,
where the analyst obtains information regarding the company from people whose use of that information is not restricted
(by employment, contractual or other duties to the company), neither the analyst nor the provider of the information has
engaged in any misconduct. Disclosure of criminal conduct on the part of the company or others can never be restricted.
In these cases, the analyst should be free to use the information so received.
However, where the analyst knows that his or her corporate source of information is not authorized in any way to
provide that information, the analyst's use of that information is improper. Similarly, where the analyst receives
information about the corporation from an outsider, but knows that the outsider has received the information without the
corporation's authority, the analyst should not use that information.
In dealing with corporate information, analysts (and others) should respect the corporation's ownership rights.
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analysis itself and the conclusions drawn from that analysis will not be publicly
available. This is yet another form of inside information-information that is created
by an outsider.
The purpose of the analyst in creating this information is, of course, to profit from
it. Such a profit can be accomplished in many ways. The analyst can sell the infor-
mation to other investors through a newsletter or other investment advisory service.
The analyst can give the information to his or her clients in the hope that the client's
trading activity on that information will generate brokerage or other fees (or general
goodwill) for the analyst. The analyst can use the information for his or her own trading
benefit, by buying or selling securities of the target company for his or her own account
or, perhaps, by deciding to mount a takeover bid for the target company. In all of these
situations, the ability of the analyst to profit from the analysis and conclusions that
he or she has produced will depend on the ability of the analyst to use the information
while it is still secret, for once the information becomes widely known whatever
trading advantage it would have provided (and whatever value it once had) is lost.
Because an analyst creates information by his or her work, he or she ought to
have rights in that information. 170 When a corporation publicly discloses information,
that information becomes part of the public domain and can no longer be regarded as
a corporate asset. When a corporation, acting through its board or other authorizing
person, authorizes employees or agents to provide information to analysts for their
use in an investment analysis of the corporation, that information is no longer secret
information owned by the company. Thus, the analyst who combines public
information and company interviews to set forth an analysis and reach conclusions
has not usurped or stolen anything;171 he or she has created new information-the
analysis and conclusions-based on other information that he or she was given or that
was already in the public domain. As the creator of this information, the analyst ought
to be regarded as its owner, just as the scientist who develops a new product or the
law professor who types out some gibberish (in the form of a law review article, of
course) ought to be regarded as the owner of that creation (or monstrosity, as the case
may be).
If the analyst owns the analysis and conclusions that he or she has produced, the
analyst ought to be free to exploit them for his or her benefit. Whether the analyst
chooses to invest directly or to sell or give the information to others who will invest,
as owner and creator of the information the analyst should have the choice of how to
exploit the information. This, of course, is not always the case under present insider
trading doctrine.' 72 It would be the case were a property rights approach to insider
trading to be implemented.
However, since most corporations are eager to cooperate with analysts, by authorizing their people to talk to them, such
respect need not materially adversely affect the flow of corporate information to analysts.
170. See Fleischer, Mundheim and Murphy, supra note 61.
171. See supra notes 165, 166 and 169.
172. Rule 14e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1986), for example prevents tender offer warehousing, a practice in which
tender offerors share their analyses and conclusions with selected arbitrageurs. See infra notes 230-33 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of warehousing, see Dooley, supra note 1, at 53; Fleiseher, Mundheim and Murphy, supra note
61, at 811-12.
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Also, under the property rights approach, unauthorized use of the analyst's
information would not be permitted. Thus, a thief who stole an analyst's working
papers or an eavesdropper who overheard an analyst's telephone conversation would
be precluded from retaining and using the benefits of that information, just as thieves
and receivers of stolen goods are precluded from retaining and benefitting from those
goods. 173
D. The Responsiveness of the Proposed Property Rights Approach to the Problems
with Present Insider Trading Doctrine
Before leaving the part of this paper that describes generally the proposed
property rights approach to insider trading, note that this approach seems to resolve
the many difficulties (described above) with the insider trading doctrine that have
developed under Rule lOb-5. Unlike the Rule lOb-5 approach, where misappropria-
tors of inside information are sometimes sanctioned and sometimes not, depending on
"relationships," under the property rights approach anyone who, without authority,
usurps inside information will be subject to sanction. Unlike the Rule lOb-5
approach, in which enforcement is up to the SEC and to market traders (who have not
necessarily been harmed by the defendant's insider trading), under the property rights
approach enforcement will be left to the owner of the information that has been stolen
or infringed.
By placing the plaintiff's role with the person whose property rights have been
infringed, the property rights approach also eliminates the difficult problems of
causation and limitations on damages that have flowed from the use of Rule lOb-5
(and its purchaser/seller rule) in the insider trading area. Where the plaintiff is the
owner of information that has been infringed upon by the defendant, there is no need
to establish a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and harm allegedly
suffered by anonymous market participants, nor is there any need to worry about
"draconian" damages. All that the plaintiff must establish is that he or she owned (or
had rights in) the information, that those ownership or other rights were infringed by
the defendant, and that the plaintiff suffered damage.
Also, when the plaintiff in an insider trading case is the owner of the inside
information, rather than a market participant, it may be appropriate to base the
plaintiff's recovery for the defendant's insider trading on the amount of the
defendant's profit. While those profits have no logical connection with the harm (if
any) suffered by market participants, disgorgement of those profits may in fact
provide an appropriate remedy when the plaintiff is the owner of the misappropriated
inside information. Because the plaintiff/information-owner could have initiated and
profited from such an insider trade, had the defendant not usurped the opportunity and
done it first, it may be appropriate to compensate the plaintiff by awarding him or her
the profits that the defendant usurped. Such a remedy would be analagous to the
constructive trusts that are imposed in corporate opportunity cases, in which the fruits
173. See Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 331; Fischel, supra note 2, at 136; Scott, supra note 1, at 814.
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of opportunities wrongly taken from the corporation are, by judicial order, held for
the benefit of the corporation. 174
E. The Responsiveness of the Proposed Property Rights Approach to the Concern
of the Securities Exchange Act for the Protection of Investors
While the property rights approach to insider trading solves these analytical
difficulties under the present doctrine, it does not ignore the need, articulated in the
Securities Exchange Act,175 to protect investors. Not only do corporate and other
owners of information have substantial incentives to sue those who usurp and benefit
from that information, 176 where the owner is a corporation the shareholders of that
corporation can sue derivatively to enforce that corporation's rights. 177 Because
attorneys' fees are often recoverable by such derivative plaintiffs, 178 and because
there generally is no dearth of shareholder plaintiffs to represent the corporate
interest when a breach of fiduciary duty or misuse of corporate property is
involved, 179 the threat of litigation by the owner of the property (or the shareholders
of the owner) ought to provide some deterrence and protection of investors from the
alleged evils of insider trading. To the extent that investors are insufficiently
protected by this approach from those evils, the SEC could remain involved in
insider trading enforcement, at least to the extent of terrorizing insider traders with
the threat of treble "damages" under the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984.180
More importantly, however, as previously indicated' 8 ' and as discussed in Part
III of this Article, it is not at all clear that insider trading is an evil from which
investors need to be protected. If insider trading is in fact beneficial (or at least not
harmful) to investors, then it is irrelevant whether the property rights approach deters
or fails to deter insider trading. Either way, investors are not harmed; they need no
protection from things that are not harmful.
174. See, e.g., Harmony Way Bridge Co. v. Leathers, 353 111. 378, 187 N.E. 432 (1933).
175. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1982).
176. If inside information is regarded as an asset to be owned by the corporation or analyst, then the trading on that
information by an unauthorized person denies the owner of the information the opportunity to authorize others to make
that trade or, perhaps, to trade on the information itself. Thus, in these circumstances, the use of the information by the
unauthorized user is like the taking of a corporate opportunity or the conversion of a person's assets. Since it is
appropriate for the owner to reclaim converted assets (or usurped opportunities), plus the profits made by the wrongdoer
from them, the owner will have a substantial incentive to sue. Under the property rights approach it will have a legitimate
claim to the profits (perhaps substantial profits) made by the wrongdoer. Where that owner is a business enterprise, its
managers will have to consider their fiduciary duties to the enterprise and its owners before declining to assert that
claim.
177. See, e.g., MoDEL BusINESS CoeroRAioN Acr, § 7.40 (1984).
178. See W. CARY AND M. EISENBERO, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 938-43 (5th ed. 1980).
179. Id. at 888.
180. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2)(A) provides that an insider trading defendant can be liable to the United States Treasury
for an amount equal to three times the amount of his or her illegal insider trading profits.
181. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
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III. THE CONSISTENCY OF THE PROPERTY
RIGHTS APPROACH WITH THE ECONOMIC ARGUMENTS
CONCERNING THE PRESENT INSIDER TRADING DOCTRINE
As is well known, there have been numerous articles, both in the law reviews
and the economics journals, that employ economic theory to analyze and criticize
insider trading doctrine.182 While this modest article does not and could not purport
to provide such analysis (since the author has little training in, and probably even less
understanding of, economic theory), it would be inappropriate in an article such as
this to ignore that important body of work. Therefore, in this part the Article attempts
to identify some of the major economic criticisms of insider trading doctrine and to
demonstrate that the property rights approach satisfactorily responds to those
criticisms.
A. The Need to Provide Incentives and Rewards for Investment Analysis
Beyond the common lav fraud and other rhetoric of the Chiarella and Dirks
opinions, the Supreme Court's fundamental messages in those cases appear to be a)
there should be no blanket prohibition on the use of informational advantages in
securities trading, 8 3 and b) the development and use of at least some informational
advantages, such as occurred in Dirks, is socially useful.184 Thus, the task of the
policy makers is to distinguish between socially useful and socially harmful
informational advantages, so that the former can be encouraged and the latter
prohibited.
But this is not a new message. For years, commentators have argued that insider
trading regulation should not stifle the flow of information to the securities markets
by impeding the work of professional and non-professional analysts of all kinds.185
As Dirks recognizes, professional securities analysts play a very useful role in
evaluating companies and their securities and bringing information and recommen-
dations about them to their clients, investors in the marketplace.' 8 6 Important as
professional securities analysts are to the information flow of the market place, others
contribute to the efficient operation of the market as well. The potential tender
offeror, the potential insurgent in a proxy fight, the arbitrageur looking for a short
term purchase and resale of a presently undervalued security, and the ordinary
182. The pioneering work is that of Henry Manne. See H. MANNE, INSIDER T ADING AND THE STOCK MARKEr (1966);
Manne, In Defense of Insider Trading, 44 HAv. Bus. REv. 113 (1966); Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors,
23 VAND. L. REv. 547 (1970).
183. See supra notes 69-81 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
185. See, e.g., Dooley, supra note 1, at 72; Fischel, supra note 2, at 130; Fleischer, Mundheim and Murphy, supra
note 61, at 830. The Supreme Court has also recognized that investment analysis is important to the marketplace, Dirks
v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658 (1983), and that the tender offers that sometimes result from the analysis of the offeror are
beneficial to the economy. See, e.g., Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 26-36 (1977); Kern County Land Co.
v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 591-95 (1973).
186. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658 (1983).
1987]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
investor (if there is such a thing) who is looking for the best buy for his or her dollar-
all of these persons contribute to the efficiency of the market when, through their
study of the information available to them, they conclude to buy undervalued
securities (or sell overvalued ones), thus moving the price of the misvalued securities
towards the value that the investor thinks proper.
To the extent that a revaluation of securities occurs through the buying and
selling of persons (or authorized tippees of persons) who have concluded from their
analysis that those securities are currently improperly valued, the market and, indeed,
society benefit because resources are now better allocated to their appropriate uses.187
Thus, as the economists (and the economics-friendly law professors) have been
telling us for years, our insider trading doctrine must encourage rather than
discourage the development and use of investment analysis and the resulting
conclusions.
The property rights approach to insider trading, outlined above, provides
incentives to analysis by permitting the owner of the information to trade on (and
profit from) that information or authorize others to do so. Thus, the corporation that
develops new information about itself (e.g., that a new product has been developed
or that a significant new asset has been acquired) ought to be able to use that
information for the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders, just as the
analyst' 88 ought to be able to use for his or her best interest the analysis and
conclusions that he or she creates based on legitimate sources of information (such as
publicly available reports and interviews with company officers who have been
authorized to disclose information). While the desirability of analysis was of course
recognized in Dirks, the reasoning there employed and the test there created by the
Court 89 to absolve the analyst from insider trading liability were both far more
complex than the simple property rights approach here proposed.
The property rights approach encourages analysis and the development of new
ideas and conclusions by permitting the owner of that information to use it as he or
she sees fit, and by prohibiting anyone but the owner (and users authorized by the
owner) from using that information. Thus, a person such as Chiarella, who had done
nothing to create the information that he used, who had not been authorized to use
that information by its owner, and who had, therefore, simply stolen that information,
would violate the property rights version of the insider trading doctrine were he to
trade in the circumstances of that case. Similarly, the property rights approach would
preclude employees, such as those in Texas Gulf Sulphur, from trading on corporate
information where, as there, they had not been authorized to do so by the corporation
that owned that information.' 90 This prohibition on the use of informational
advantages by all persons other than the owner (and the owner's authorized users)
187. See, e.g., Carlton & Fischel, supra note 1, at 866; Macey, supra note 4, at 15; Wu, An Economist Looks at
Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 68 CoLuM. L. R~v. 260, 263, 265, 269 (1968).
188. As used here, this term includes more than the professional investment analyst. It includes anyone who, by his
or her own efforts, develops information and conclusions regarding the desirability of investing in particular securities.
189. See supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text.
190. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 847 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
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also promotes the development of information by recognizing and protecting the
rights of the owner in the information created.
Thus, the property rights approach distinguishes between socially useful and
harmful informational advantages, permitting the former and proscribing the latter.
By basing this distinction on the notion of ownership of the information, the property
rights approach also deals with the concern-expressed in Section 2 of the Securities
Exchange Act-that the securities markets be fair.19' Because the users of informa-
tional advantages under this approach are those who have created the information and
who may trade on the information directly or authorize others to do so, there should
be much less concern for the fairness of the markets under this approach than under
present insider trading doctrine. While present doctrine permits trading by some
usurpers of information-people such as Mr. Chiarella who have done nothing to
create the information that they use-the property rights approach proscribes such
trading, thereby eliminating the substantial fairness concern with people profiting
from information that they did not create and were not authorized to use.
B. Insider Trading Provides Information to the Market and Points the Market in
the Right Direction
Sometimes the securities markets do not properly value securities simply
because relevant information concerning the securities is not known to the market-
place. Such information could be corporate information-for example, that the
corporation has acquired significant new assets or is about to be sued for billions of
dollars--or market information-for example, that an investor, having concluded
from his or her analysis that a company's securities are undervalued, is about to start
buying (and recommending that his or her friends and clients buy) significant
amounts of securities. In either case, there may be no obligation (nor should there be
an obligation) that the corporation or the investor disclose the information to the
market. 192
With respect to corporate information, the decision of the board of directors or
authorized corporate officer not to disclose that information obviously indicates a
determination by that body or person that the best interests of the corporation and the
shareholders would be better served by concealment than by disclosure. That
191. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1982).
192. The federal securities laws do not require disclosure of material information in all circumstances. Under Section
7 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77g (1982), a company's registration statement for a public offering of
securities must contain all material information required to prevent the information presented from being misleading.
Similarly, under Section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1982), reports that the company
is required to file with the SEC must be complete and not misleading. However, when a company is not in the process
of registering securities or filing reports with the SEC it has no duty under the federal securities laws to disclose
information-even important information--to the public. If the company is in possession of such undisclosed information,
its insiders are precluded from trading in its securities under the so called "disclose or abstain rule" announced in the
Texas Gulf Sulphur case and discussed infra in notes 193-95 and accompanying text.
However, companies that have listed their securities on stock exchanges are subject to the requirements of the
exchange. Such requirements may include an undertaking on the part of the corporation to promptly disclose material
information concerning the enterprise.
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determination having been made, no individual corporate agent would then be
authorized to make disclosure of the information to the market.
Existing insider trading doctrine recognizes the ability of the corporation to serve
its and its shareholders best interests by witholding even material information, 193 at
least so long as the failure reveal the information does not render misleading any
report, press release or registration statement that the company might make.
However, while material information remains undisclosed by the company, insiders
are prohibited by existing doctrine from trading in the company's securities. 194 This
is the so called "disclose or abstain" rule, which does not mandate disclosure; 195 in
fact, because most corporate agents are not authorized to disclose the inside
information, the typical means of complying with this rule is by abstention rather than
by disclosure.
Thus, companies routinely possess information, including significant informa-
tion, which is not known to the marketplace and which, if known, could have a
significant effect on the valuation of the company's securities. Not only is this
permitted by existing doctrine, it is also desirable under the proposed property rights
approach, since the company, as owner of the information in question, ought to be
able to decide that corporate and shareholder interests would be served best (if that
is the case) by withholding the information or, alternatively, to decide that those
interests would be served best (if that is the case) by the disclosure of the information
to the public.
Similarly, analysts routinely possess information about companies that is not
publicly known which, if it were publicly known, would affect the value of the
company's securities. Here again, existing doctrine does not coerce the revelation of
this information.196 As Dirks recognized, there is a need to provide incentives to
analysts to provide the useful, analytical services that they bring to the market. 197 If
their analyses and conclusions had to be made public before the analyst could profit
from them, there would be no incentive for analysis.
Recognizing, therefore, that the market does not immediately receive all of the
information that it needs to "properly" value securities, should insider trading in the
undisclosed information be permitted? One response is that insider trading should not
be permitted because it is unfair to permit some to have and use informational
advantages over others. 198 However, because the Supreme Court has clearly rejected
a blanket prohibition on informational advantages, and because present insider
trading doctrine permits insider trading in situations (like Chiarella) where the use of
inside information is clearly unfair, 199 this response is not adequate. Furthermore, as
earlier indicated, if the proposed property rights approach were to be adopted, it
would go a long way toward eliminating unfairness as a concern in insider trading.
193. See supra note 192; SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
194. Id.
195. See Carlton and Fischel, supra note 1, at 885.
196. See supra note 60.
197. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658-59 (1983).
198. For analyses of this response, see Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 323; Scott, supra note 1, at 805.
199. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
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A better response would be to permit insider trading if it is beneficial to the
market or to prohibit it if it is not. When a corporation decides to authorize employees
or others to buy its securities, because it has favorable, undisclosed information
which indicates that the securities are undervalued, those purchase orders by insiders
will result in an increased demand for the securities, thereby increasing their market
value. Similarly, when an analyst tells his or her clients to sell securities, because the
analyst has developed information indicating that they are overvalued, those sell
orders will result in an increased supply of those securities, thus decreasing their
market value. In both cases, the trading by the insider moves the market value in the
direction that it would have moved, had disclosure of the inside information been
made. Thus, unlike misrepresentations or misleading statements (which move the
market in the direction opposite to the true information), 200 trading on undisclosed,
accurate information moves the market in the proper direction.
This effect of insider trading is beneficial to the market and to investors who may
be buying or selling the company's securities. 20' Because the company and/or the
analyst have the right not to disclose inside information (within the limits previously
discussed) 202 when that is in their best interests, the alternative to insider trading is
not public disclosure; it is abstention by insiders from trading. However, were
insiders to so abstain, the market would be denied the partial information that it
receives from the market activity of the insiders-activity that at least moves the
market in the direction that it will take when full disclosure is made. In short, a half
a loaf (provided by insider trading) is better than nothing at all.
The proposed property rights approach to insider trading allows this half loaf to
be provided to the securities markets. Because that approach permits owners of the
inside information to use it in any way they choose, those owners can trade
themselves or permit others to do so. Thus, where trading or tipping serves the best
interest of the owner, presumably insider trading will take place, either by the owner
or his or her tippee, with the effect that the market will be moved in the direction
consistent with the nature of the information.
C. The Plaintiff Would Have Traded Anyway
Closely related to the economic argument that insider trading is beneficial to the
market is the argument that present insider trading doctrine is illogical in allowing
persons who have not been injured to litigate and recover as plaintiffs. Because these
persons would have traded anyway, even absent insider trading in the marketplace,
it makes no sense to allow them to sue the insider trader who did them no harm and
who may, in fact, have helped them get a better price for their securities.
The observation that market participants who bought or sold (while lacking the
inside information on which the defendant was engaging in transactions of the
opposite character) would have done so anyway logically follows from the nature of
200. See Carlton and Fischel, supra note 1, at 883; Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 318.
201. Id.
202. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
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the present insider trading proscription, which is that the insider must disclose or
refrain from trading. Given the disjunctive nature of this proscription, it is perfectly
possible (and, as earlier indicated, in most cases quite certain) that compliance with
this rule will not result in disclosure. 20 3 Since the insider's abstention from the market
will satisfy the rule and since most insiders are not authorized or disposed to disclose
the information that they have, in most cases abstention rather than disclosure is the
means of compliance with the present doctrine. Because compliance does not require
or, as a practical matter, result in disclosure, the insider trading has not harmed those
market participants generally (or even those who specifically allege that they would
not have traded had they known the inside information), for those participants would
have traded even if the insiders had complied with the law by staying out of the
market.2Z4
In fact, as earlier indicated, it is very likely that the insider trading of which
these plaintiffs complain actually benefitted them. Because an insider's purchases of
securities increase the market value of the securities,20 5 the shareholder who sells in
the market while insider buying is going on should receive more on the sale than he
or she otherwise would receive. Similarly, because an insider's sales of securities
decrease the market value of those securities, the investor who buys in the market
while insider selling is going on should buy at a lower price than he or she would
otherwise have to pay.
The proposed property rights approach to insider trading is consistent with the
view that market participants should not be plaintiffs in insider trading litigation.
Under the proposed approach, the owner of the information should be the sole private
plaintiff. If that owner has not authorized the use by the defendant of the information
in question, that owner-the one whose property has been stolen and who therefore
has clearly been harmed-is the proper person to bring the lawsuit. Thus, the
property rights approach avoids the use of inappropriate, unharmed plaintiffs in
insider trading litigation.
D. Insider Trading as a Means of Compensation
One legitimate use of insider trading, it has been argued,20 6 is to compensate
corporate managers for their contributions to the company. When an employee has
developed a new product or discovered new minerals, one way to reward him or her
is to allow that person to buy corporate securities at their present price, in anticipation
of the price increase that will follow the subsequent corporate announcement of the
development. Of course, using insider trading as a means of compensation is
appropriate only where developments are favorable; where the managers have run the
enterprise into the ground they ought not be "compensated" by being allowed to bail
203. See supra notes 192-200 and accompanying text.
204. See Carlton and Fischel, supra note 1, at 889; Dooley, supra note 1, at 21; Macey, supra note 4, at 47-48.
205. See Carlton and Fisehel, supra note 1, at 868; Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 335.
206. For discussions of this argument, see Carlton and Fischel, supra note 1, at 858, 876; Easterbrook, supra note
2, at 332; Scott, supra note 1, at 808.
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out of their company securities before the market gets the news that the company is
in trouble. 20 7
As with all compensation matters, the decision to use insider trading to
compensate a particular person ought to be within the discretion of the board of
directors or of the officer or committee, if any, to whom or to which the board has
delegated authority over corporate compensation matters. 208 In exercising that
discretion, the authorized body obviously must act in the best interests of the
enterprise and its owners. 209 Thus, while it might be appropriate to permit a creative
employee to trade on the undisclosed information of his or her new invention for the
company since compensation for such inventions may serve the company's best
interest, it would not be appropriate to permit poorly performing managers to bail out
before news of the company's misfortune is known since extraordinary compensation
for malperformance is not in the company's best interest.
While there are, of course, many other (and better) ways to compensate
employees than insider trading,210 the use of insider trading as a compensation
mechanism is allowed under the proposed property rights approach. Under that
approach, the corporate owner of the inside information may authorize others,
including employees or agents of the corporation, to use such information when that
is in the corporation's best interests. Thus, if those interests would be served by using
insider trading to compensate a particular employee, the corporation could do that
consistent with the proposed property rights approach.
The proposed property rights approach to insider trading regulation seems to
respond well to the economic criticisms and concerns identified above. Because of its
consistency with economic theory and its ability to overcome many of the difficulties
with our present, problematic insider trading doctrine, the property rights approach
has much to commend it. The final question, to be addressed in the next part of this
Article, is how and under what authority to implement this proposed approach.
IV. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROPOSED APPROACH
A. Implementing the Proposed Approach Under State Corporation Law
As is obvious from the earlier discussion, one way to at least partially implement
the proposed property rights approach is through state corporation law. Under those
state laws, directors, officers, controlling shareholders, and certain other employees
and agents have fiduciary responsibiliies to the enterprise.211 Among those fiduciary
duties is the duty of loyalty-the duty to put the best interests of the enterprise ahead
207. For an example of this type of situation, see Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301
N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969).
208. See H. HENN ANO J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CopmRAioo.s 665-70 (3d ed. 1983).
209. See, e.g., MODE BusiNmss CoR.olsAsloN Act §§ 8.30 and 8.42 (1984).
210. See supra notes 206-08.
211. See, e.g., Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969); MODEL
BusNEss COMPORATION Acr §§ 8.30 and 8.42 (1984); W. CARY AND M. EesEBmr, supra note 178, at 518-712.
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of one's personal interests. 212 A variant of the duty of loyalty is the "corporate
opportunity" doctrine, under which fiduciaries are not supposed to take for
themselves business opportunities which are connected with the enterprise's business
activities, unless the governing body of the enterprise has authorized the fiduciary's
taking of that opportunity. 213
These general fiduciary duties obviously have relevance in the insider trading
area, at least where the person who trades on inside information is a fiduciary to the
corporation or enterprise in whose securities he or she trades. If one accepts the
notion that inside information regarding the enterprise is owned by the enterprise and
that the enterprise can do with it what it wishes, then the act of an officer, director,
or other fiduciary in taking and trading on that information (without authority) for
himself or herself violates the duty of loyalty; such a taking puts personal interest
ahead of the interests of the enterprise.
Such a taking also arguably constitutes the usurpation of a corporate opportu-
nity. If the information taken and traded on was in fact that of the enterprise, on
which the enterprise itself could have traded (or otherwise profitably dealt), the taking
of that opportunity by an officer, director, or other fiduciary seems a violation of the
corporate opportunity doctrine.
Even if the corporate opportunity doctrine is somehow inapplicable, if one
accepts the notion that undisclosed information regarding corporate developments
and activities is an asset of the corporation, then the taking and use of such a
corporate asset by an unauthorized fiduciary obviously raises serious fiduciary duty
issues. Corporate assets are not supposed to be used for personal purposes; they are
supposed to be used for the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders.
Of course, if the board of directors of the corporation (or governing body of a
non-corporate enterprise) were to determine that an officer, director, or other
fiduciary should be able to trade on inside information regarding the enterprise, under
the proposed property rights approach such trading would raise no fiduciary duty
problems. Such a determination indicates that the board or governing body believes
that such trading is in the enterprise's best interest and that the enterprise consents to
the use of its informational asset in that way. Thus, since the board controls the affairs
of the corporation, 2 14 when the corporation's consent has been given in this way there
is no breach of the duty of loyalty, 215 no usurpation of corporate opportunities 216 and
no improper personal use of corporate assets when the authorized insider trades.
The idea of using state corporate fiduciary duty concepts to regulate insider
trading by those with a fiduciary duty to the enterprise is not new. In Diamond v.
212. New York Trust Co. v. American Realty Co., 244 N.Y. 209, 155 N.E. 102 (1926); MODEL BusLtSS
CORPoPATON Acr §§ 8.30(a)(3) and 8.42(a)(3) (1984); W. CARY AND M. EIStaBER, supra note 178, at 563-712.
213. See Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (1939); Miller v. Miller, 301 Minn. 207, 222 N.W.2d
71 (1974); A.C. Petters Co. v. St. Cloud Enter., Inc., 301 Minn. 261,222 N.W.2d 83 (1974); W. CARY AND M. EISENBERG,
supra note 178, at 594.
214. MODE BUSINESS CORPORA-nON AcT § 8.01(b) (1984).
215. Id. at § 8.31(a)(1).
216. See supra note 213.
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Oreamuno,2 17 the New York Court of Appeals determined that shareholders suing
derivatively on behalf of the corporation could state a cause of action for breach of
fiduciary duty against officers who sold their corporate securities on the basis of
undisclosed, adverse information regarding the corporation's earnings.21 8 In reaching
the conclusion in 1969 that state fiduciary duty concepts should apply to insider
trading by corporate officers and directors, that court was influenced by what it then
perceived to be a paucity of effective federal regulation of insider trading.
219
During the early 1970s, of course, federal regulation of insider trading under
Rule lOb-5 flourished, 220 proving (at least for a while) that the Diamond court's
concern about lack of federal regulation was misplaced. While the Supreme Court
has, since the mid-1970s, attempted to restrict the lower courts' expansive use of
Rule lOb-5, 22 l between 1969 and 1975 those courts put that rule to creative and ever
expanding uses in a number of areas, including insider trading. It was after this
expansion that the Diamond doctrine-that state corporate law fiduciary principles
could be used to proscribe insider trading-was rejected by other courts. 22 2
Perhaps one reason for this rejection of the doctrine was the view by those courts
that Diamond, which had been based in part on the court of appeal's concern about
lack of federal regulation, was no longer an appropriate decision in light of the
development of that regulation. If that is so, the courts might be less emphatic in their
rejection of Diamond today since the use of Rule lOb-5 as a regulator of corporate
conduct, including insider trading, is now contracting rather than expanding 22 3 (as it
was at the time of Diamond's rejection).
Whether or not the development of federal regulation contributed to Diamond's
rejection by the courts, one clear reason for that rejection was the courts' inability to
conclude that insider trading harms the corporation. Since a derivative plaintiff suing
on behalf of the corporation must allege damage to the enterprise,22 4 absent damage
to the corporation courts were unwilling to follow the Diamond rationale and let
derivative suits proceed for breach of fiduciary duty through insider trading.2 25 While
the Diamond court had found damage to the corporation through the reputational
harm that the enterprise suffered from the disclosure that its officers were insider
traders, 226 other courts were unwilling to make this finding.
To the extent that damage to the enterprise has been a stumbling block to the use
of fiduciary duty principles to regulate insider trading under state law, that should not
217. 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969).
218. Id. at 498-500, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912-13, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 81-83.
219. Id. at 502, 248 N.E.2d 910, 914-15, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 84-85.
220. See generally R. JENINGs AND H. MARSH, supra note 42, at 912-22; Dooley, supra note I; Scott, supra note 1.
221. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). See also Aaron v.
Securities Exchange Commission, 446 U.S. 680 (1980); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
222. See supra note 24.
223. See supra note 211. Although the Supreme Court has clearly sought to curtail the reach of Section 10b and Rule
l0b-5, the lower courts often resist the Supreme Court's teachings in this area. See, e.g., R. JENINos AND H. MARSH, supra
note 42, at 951-52.
224. See W. CARv ANo M. EISENBERG, supra note 178, at 897-98.
225. See supra note 24.
226. 24 N.Y.2d at 497, 248 N.E.2d 910, 911, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 80 (1969).
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be the case if the proposed property rights approach is adopted. If the proposed
property rights approach were adopted, there would be no question that the
corporation, such as the one in Diamond, suffered damage when its officers traded on
undisclosed, corporate information without authority; that information is an asset of
the corporation, the unauthorized taking of which harms the corporation just as the
unauthorized taking of a company car for personal use harms the corporation.
Thus, while state law fiduciary duty concepts have been used somewhat
unsuccessfully in an effort to regulate insider trading under state law, it may be time
to try those concepts again. Because of the change in the federal regulatory climate
and because the proposed property rights approach is responsive to at least one of the
major problems that courts previously found with Diamond, the time for regulation
of insider trading through state corporate law, fiduciary duty principles may now have
come.
Of course, state corporate fiduciary principles are useful in the regulation of
insider trading only when the trading is being done by a person (or the tippee of a
person) who is subject to such principles, 227 such as an officer, director, or
controlling shareholder. Where the defendant is an outsider, who has no fiduciary
duty to the enterprise, those principles may not apply.
However, even assuming that an "outsider" is not subject to state law fiduciary
duty concepts, he or she is still subject to state law conversion principles. Thus, the
outsider who takes information developed and owned by another and uses it without
authority for his own benefit can be liable in conversion to the owner of that
information.
Also, it may be that such an "outsider" breaches a state law fiduciary duty when
he or she trades or tips. 2 2 8 Where the trading or tipping person has no relationship to
the company in whose securities he or she trades, but has an agency or employment
relationship with the analyst (or other person) from whom information about the
company was taken, that person may violate a fiduciary duty to that analyst in taking
information for his or her own use.
B. Implementing the Proposed Approach Under Federal Securities Law
While one way to implement the proposed property rights approach would be
through the use of state law,2 29 in light of the historical reliance on federal law as a
regulator of insider trading, it would be inappropriate to conclude this Article without
considering whether the proposed approach could be accomplished under existing
federal securities law. As the following analysis attempts to demonstrate, a portion of
the proposed approach could be implemented, were the courts and the SEC so
227. See supra note 211.
228. See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 193 (1933);
O'Connor & Associates v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1179 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); note 241, infra. The
Supreme Court has yet to pass on the theory embraced in these cases-that breach of duty to a person other than the issuer
of the securities can constitute a fraud for purposes of Rule lOb-5. There is language in Dirks which suggests that the
Court will not embrace this theory, when and if it is presented. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654-64 (1983).
229. State fiduciary duty principles are not the only possible means of implementation at the state level. Specific
legislation dealing with this proposal is another possibility. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 25402 (West 1977).
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inclined, under the authority of the existing statutory and administrative framework
of the federal securities laws. However, because of Rule lOb-5's purchaser-seller
standing limitation, and because not all of the proposed approach will fit within the
"fraud" language of that Rule, it would be better to adopt the proposed approach
through new federal legislation specifically designed for that purpose.
Insider trading is regulated under federal securities law by Section 16b of
Securities Exchange Act, Section 10b of that statute and Rule lOb-5 thereunder, and
Rule 14e-3 230 under Section 14e231 of the Securities Exchange Act. Rule 14e-3 is
inconsistent with the proposed property rights approach. Among other things, this
rule precludes a tender offeror (or authorized people connected with the tender
offeror) from tipping information about the planned tender to others. z32
This rule, therefore, prevents "warehousing, 233 a practice in which the tender
offeror alerts arbitrageurs to the pendency of the tender, in advance of the public
announcement of it, so that they can buy up target company securities with a view to
reselling them in the tender. Warehousing is obviously beneficial to the tender
offeror-if it were not beneficial, tender offerors would not help arbitraguers to
engage in it-since it places target company securities in the hands of persons (the
arbitrageurs) who are eager to sell out in the tender offer.
Rule 14e-3's prohibition on warehousing and other forms of tipping of
information by the tender offeror to others is obviously inconsistent with the proposed
property rights approach to the regulation of insider trading. Under the property rights
approach, the tender offeror, who has analyzed the target company, concluded that
its securities are undervalued, and determined to make a tender offer for those
securities, is regarded as the owner of that information. As such, he or she should be
free to do with that information what he or she wishes, including giving it to others,
such as arbitrageurs, for purposes that will benefit the tender offeror. To the extent
that Rule 14e-3 prevents this, it is of course inconsistent with the proposed property
rights approach.
However, Rule 14e-3 need not necessarily remain the law (assuming for the
moment that it is the law). 234 Were the SEC to subscribe to the proposed property
rights approach, it could easily amend the rule to make it consistent with that
approach. Furthermore, there have long been substantial doubts as to the validity of
Rule 14e-3, due to the fact that it attempts to preclude under Section 14e conduct that
the Supreme Court said could not be precluded under the similar (but not identical)
language of Section 10b. 235 The doubts about Rule 14e-3's validity are now even
greater, after the Supreme Court's recent pronouncement that Section 14e can
regulate only manipulative and deceptive conduct. 236
230. See supra note 172.
231. See supra note 85.
232. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982).
233. See supra note 172.
234. See supra notes 88-89.
235. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). Compare note 16 with note 85, supra.
236. In Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985), the Supreme Court interpreted Section 14e in
light of the Court's Section 10b jurisprudence and held - . . . that the term 'manipulative' as used in § 14(e) requires
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While Rule 14e-3 in its present form is clearly inconsistent, at least to some
extent, with the proposed property rights approach to the regulation of insider trading,
Section 16b is clearly consistent with that approach. This is because Section 16b
really has little to do with insider trading;237 it simply prevents short swing trading by
officers, directors, and certain shareholders, whether or not they have any inside
information. Therefore, since inside information is usually irrelevant to the applica-
tion of the statute, the ownership of that information and the circumstances of its
acquisition are also usually irrelevant. 238
That leaves Section 10b and Rule lOb-5, the provisions under which most
federal regulation of insider trading has taken place. Can the proposed property rights
approach be adopted under the authority of, and consistent with, the language of
those provisions?
Because Section 10b proscribes manipulative and deceptive securities-connected
conduct, the Supreme Court has said that the kind of conduct actionable under that
section (and Rule lOb-5 thereunder) is fraud. 239 The Supreme Court has already
indicated that insider trading is fraudulent when it breaches a fiduciary duty that the
trader owes to the company in whose securities he or she trades. 240 Thus, there is no
question that the usurpation of corporate information by an officer, director, or other
fiduciary constitutes fraud. The property rights approach is therefore compatible with
Section 10b and Rule lOb-5, at least to the extent that it proscribes the usurpation by
corporate officers and directors of information owned by the corporation.
Where insider trading is based on inside information taken from an analyst, such
as his or her conclusion that a particular security is misvalued by the market, that
trading may or may not be fraudulent.241 Where the usurper has a fiduciary
relationship to the analyst from which the information was taken, as Mr. Chiarella
may have had to the tender offeror in that case, the misappropriation of that
information is probably fraudulent. Where the usurper of the information has no
relationship with the person from whom the information was taken or with the
company to which the information relates (as would be the case, for example, where
a thief, burglar, or eavesdropper simply stole information from an unrelated analyst
or corporation), the question becomes whether that sort of thievery constitutes fraud
within the meaning of Section 10b and Rule lOb-5.
misrepresentation or nondisclosure. It connotes 'conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or
artificially affecting the price of securities.'" Since conduct such as Chiarella's was not fraudulent, manipulative or
deceptive for Section 10b purposes, query whether it can now be so regarded for Section 14e purposes.
237. See Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 315; Phillips and Zutz, supra note 4, at 72.
238. See Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co., 404 U.S. 418 (1972). But see Kern County Land Co. v.
Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973).
239. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 471-74 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,
197-206 (1976).
240. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226-30 (1980). See also Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653-55
(1983).
241. See United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 17-18 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983); United
States v. Winans, 612 F. Supp. 827, 838-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); SEC v. Musella, 578 F. Supp. 425, 438-39 (S.D.N.Y.
1984). But see Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 464, 654-64 (1983) and supra note 228.
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Because there is authority for the proposition that stealing assets can constitute
fraud for purposes of Section 10b and Rule lOb-5, 242 it is at least arguable that any
theft of information owned by another is fraudulent. If that is so, then any
unauthorized insider trading on information owned by another (in violation of the
proposed property rights approach to insider trading) always comes within Section
10b and Rule lOb-5.
However, the authority for that proposition is not unassailable. 243 It includes the
Supreme Court's opinion in Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life and
Casualty Co.2 44 case (the continuing vitality of which has been questioned), in which
the Court determined that a private plaintiff could state a cause of action under Rule
lOb-5 against a person who, in connection with his misappropriation of corporate
assets, caused the corporation to sell securities and lied to the corporation's directors
about the disposition of the proceeds of that sale. 245
While the Bankers Life case has been cited for the proposition that "just plain
stealing" amounts to fraud for purposes of Rule lOb-5,246 the case did not involve
insider trading and did involve an affirmative misrepresentation-a fraud-in
addition to the theft of corporate assets. 247 Accordingly, it has been argued that the
case does not support the proposition that a theft of information in connection with
insider trading constitutes fraud for purposes of Rule 1Ob-5, and that something other
than theft is required to bring that rule into play. 248
The other authority that supports the proposition that misappropriation of
information owned by another should constitute a fraud for purposes of Rule lOb-5
is Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Chiarella.249 While the Court and commentators
continue to discuss the notion that misappropriation of information might be
fraudulent under Rule lOb-5, the Court has not yet accepted that idea.2 0
Thus, when an eavesdropper, burglar or thief steals and trades on information
owned by another, he or she contravenes the proposed property rights approach to
insider trading, by using information owned by another without permission.
However, he or she may not violate Section 10b and Rule lOb-5, as presently
construed, since the theft of that information may not constitute fraudulent conduct.
That section and rule are violated though by a person, such as an officer or agent, who
steals information from one with whom he has a fiduciary relationship. 25 1 Therefore,
Section 10b and Rule lOb-5 can subsume most, but not all, of the insider trading
situations covered by the proposed property rights approach. To cover insider trading
242. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 10 (1971); R. JENINGS AND H. MARSH,
supra note 42, at 949.
243. See Aldave, supra note 71, at 118-19.
244. 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
245. Id. at I0.
246. R. JENN~ras AnD H. MARSH, supra note 42, at 949.
247. 404 U.S. 6, 7-9 (1971).
248. See Aldave, supra note 71, at 118-19.
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by eavesdroppers, burglars, and thieves (an insignificant portion of the insider trading
population, one would guess), it may be necessary to amend the statute and rule, or
to rely on the state law principles discussed above.
A more important problem with the integration of the proposed property rights
approach into the existing language of Section 10b and Rule lOb-5 arises because of
the purchaser-seller standing limitation imposed by that Rule in private litigation.
Under that Rule, private plaintiffs in Rule lOb-5 cases must have purchased or sold
securities. However, in many cases, the owner of misappropriated inside information
will not be such a purchaser or seller of securities, and so will not qualify as a private
plaintiff under that existing statute and rule.
Since the proposed property rights approach is based on the idea that the owner
of the information should be the one to complain of its misuse, this purchaser-seller
is obviously a major impediment to the implementation of the proposed approach
under Section 10b and Rule lOb-5. A legislative modification would therefore be
appropriate, were the proposed property rights approach to become part of federal
securities law.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Article has been to try to set forth a simplified framework
for the analysis and enforcement of restrictions on insider trading. As the Article has
demonstrated (at least the author hopes so), treating inside information as property,
determining the owner of that property, and permitting the owner to exercise rights
of ownership with respect to that property, eliminate many of the existing problems
with, and criticisms of, our insider trading doctrine. Were this simple approach to be
implemented, it could be accomplished under state law or, with revisions to Section
l0b and to Rule 14e-3, under federal law.
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